HC/E/AU 69
AUSTRALIA
Full Court of the Family Court of Australia at Sydney
Appellate Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AUSTRALIA
14 March 1996
Final
Habitual Residence - Art. 3 | Removal and Retention - Arts 3 and 12 | Rights of Custody - Art. 3 | Procedural Matters
Appeal dismissed, return refused
-
The Convention does not contemplate the possibility of dual habitual residences. Articles 3 and 15, as well as the Preamble, all refer to 'the State of a child's habitual residence' not 'a State.' Article 13 refers to 'the central or other competent authority of the child's habitual residence' and not 'of a habitual residence of the child.' The court found that the children were habitually resident in Australia at the date of the removal, consequently the return application failed.
The words removal and retention must be construed in the context of the entire Convention, including the Preamble. In this context the critical phrase of the Preamble is the desire of Contracting States to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures for their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence. Removal and retention are co-relative terms, each being the converse of the other and each importing a notion of physical movement of a material object, in the former case 'from' and in the latter case 'to' a place in the material world. To be wrongful a removal under the Convention does not have to be from the country of the child's habitual residence. 'Removal to' is meant to refer to a physical movement of children into a Contracting State from a place outside it.
Breach of Custody Rights Wrongfulness is to be determined in accordance with the law of the child's State of habitual residence.
Referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1980, the court held that the terms removal and retention were clear and settled, leaving no ambiguity or obscurity. Therefore there was no need to resort to the travaux preparatoires as an aid to interpretation.
Conflicts have on occasion emerged between courts in different Contracting States as to the outcomes in individual cases. This has primarily been with regard to the interpretation of custody rights or the separate, but related issue of the ‘wrongfulness' of a removal or retention.
Conflict Based on Scope of ‘Rights of Custody'
Whilst the overwhelming majority of Contracting States have accepted a uniform interpretation of rights of custody for the purposes of the Convention, some differences do exist.A
For example: in New Zealand a very broad view prevails - Gross v. Boda [1995] 1 NZLR 569 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 66]. But in parts of the United States of America a narrow view is favoured - Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir., 2000; cert. den. Oct. 9, 2001) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 313].
Consequently where a return petition involves either of these States a conflict may arise with the other Contracting State as to whether a right of custody does or does not exist and therefore whether the removal or retention is wrongful.
New Zealand / United Kingdom - England & Wales
Hunter v. Murrow [2005] EWCA Civ 976, [2005] 2 F.L.R. 1119 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 809].
A positive determination of wrongfulness by the courts in the child's State of habitual residence in New Zealand was rejected by the English Court of Appeal which found the applicant father to have no rights of custody for the purposes of the Convention.
United Kingdom - Scotland / United States of America (Virginia)
Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied 157 L. Ed. 2d 732, 124 S. Ct. 805 (2003) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 494].
For the purposes of Scots law the removal of the child was in breach of actually exercised rights of custody. This view was however rejected by the US Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit.
United States of America / United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re P. (A Child) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [2004] EWCA CIV 971, [2005] Fam. 293, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 591].
Making a return order the English Court of Appeal held that the rights given to the father by the New York custody order were rights of custody for Convention purposes, whether or not New York state or federal law so regarded them whether for domestic purposes or Convention purposes.
Conflict Based on Interpretation of ‘Wrongfulness'
United Kingdom - England & Wales
The Court of Appeal has traditionally held the view that the issue of wrongfulness is a matter for law of the forum, regardless of the law of the child's State of habitual residence.
Re F. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights Abroad) [1995] Fam 224 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 8].
Whilst the respondent parent had the right under Colorado law to remove their child out of the jurisdiction unilaterally the removal was nevertheless regarded as being wrongful by the English Court of Appeal.
Re P. (A Child) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [2004] EWCA CIV 971, [2005] Fam. 293, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 591];
Hunter v. Murrow [2005] EWCA Civ 976, [2005] 2 F.L.R. 1119 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 809].
In the most extreme example this reasoning was applied notwithstanding an Article 15 declaration to the contrary, see:
Deak v. Deak [2006] EWCA Civ 830 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 866].
However, this finding was overturned by the House of Lords which unanimously held that where an Article 15 declaration is sought the ruling of the foreign court as to the content of the rights held by the applicant must be treated as conclusive, save in exceptional cases where, for example, the ruling has been obtained by fraud or in breach of the rules of natural justice:
Re D. (A Child) (Abduction: Foreign Custody Rights) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 A.C. 619, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 880].
Elsewhere there has been an express or implied preference for the general application of the law of the child's State of habitual residence to the issue of wrongfulness, see:
Australia
S. Hanbury-Brown and R. Hanbury-Brown v. Director General of Community Services (Central Authority) (1996) FLC 92-671, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 69];
Austria
3Ob89/05t, Oberster Gerichtshof, 11/05/2005 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AT 855];
6Ob183/97y, Oberster Gerichtshof, 19/06/1997 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AT 557];
Canada
Droit de la famille 2675, Cour supérieure de Québec, 22 April 1997, No 200-04-003138-979[INCADAT cite : HC/E/CA 666];
Germany
11 UF 121/03, Oberlandesgericht Hamm, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 822];
2 UF 115/02, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 944];
United States of America
Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2008), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 970].
The United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit refused to recognize a Spanish non-return order, finding that the Spanish courts had applied their own law rather than the law of New Jersey in assessing whether the applicant father held rights of custody.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR)
The ECrtHR has been prepared to intervene where interpretation of rights of custody has been misapplied:
Monory v. Hungary & Romania, (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 37, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ 802].
In Monory the ECrtHR found that there had been a breach of the right to family life in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) where the Romanian courts had so misinterpreted Article 3 of the Hague Convention that the guarantees of the latter instrument itself were violated.
Academic commentators have long held that if the factual nature of the connecting factor is to be respected then situations may arise where an individual is habitually resident in more than one place at a particular time, see in particular:
Clive E. M. ‘The Concept of Habitual Residence' Juridical Review (1997), p. 137.
However, the Court of Appeal in England has accepted in the context of divorce jurisdiction that it is possible for an adult to be habitually resident in two places simultaneously, see:
Ikimi v. Ikimi [2001] EWCA Civ 873, [2002] Fam 72.
Courts in Convention proceedings have though held to the view that a child can only have one habitual residence, see for example:
Canada
SS-C c GC, Cour supérieure (Montréal), 15 août 2003, n° 500-04-033270-035, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CA 916];
Wilson v. Huntley (2005) A.C.W.S.J. 7084; 138 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1107 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CA 800];
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re V. (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [1995] 2 FLR 992, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 45].
In this case where the children's lives alternated between Greece and England the court held that their habitual residence also alternated. The court ruled out their having concurrent habitual residences in both Greece and England.
United Kingdom - Northern Ireland
Re C.L. (A Minor); J.S. v. C.L., transcript, 25 August 1998, High Court of Northern Ireland, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKn 390];
United States of America
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, (6th Cir. 1993), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 142].
Primarily this will be a factual question for the court seised of the return petition. The issue may be of relevance where there is doubt as to whether the 12 month time limit referred to in Article 12(1) has elapsed, or indeed if there is uncertainty as to whether the alleged wrongful act has occurred before or after the entry into force of the Convention between the child's State of habitual residence and the State of refuge.
International Dimension
A legal issue which has arisen and been settled with little controversy in several States, is that as the Convention is only concerned with international protection for children from removal or retention and not with removal or retention within the State of their habitual residence, the removal or retention in question must of necessity be from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of the child's habitual residence and not simply from the care of holder of custody rights.
Australia
Murray v. Director, Family Services (1993) FLC 92-416, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 113].
State Central Authority v. Ayob (1997) FLC 92-746, 21 Fam. LR 567, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 232]; Kay J. confirmed that time did not run, for the purposes of Art. 12, from the moment the child arrived in the State of refuge.
State Central Authority v. C.R. [2005] Fam CA 1050, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 232]; Kay J. held that the precise determination of time had to be calculated in accordance with local time at the place where the wrongful removal had occurred.
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re H.; Re S. (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1991] 2 AC 476, [1991] 3 All ER 230, [1991] 2 FLR 262, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 115].
United Kingdom - Scotland
Findlay v. Findlay 1994 SLT 709, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 184].
However in a very early Convention case Kilgour v. Kilgour 1987 SC 55, 1987 SLT 568, 1987 SCLR 344, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 116], the parties were at one in proceeding on the basis that the relevant removal for the purposes of the Convention was a removal in breach of custody rights rather than a removal from the country where the child previously lived.
Agreement on the issue of the commencement of return was not reached in the Israeli case Family Application 000111/07 Ploni v. Almonit, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IL 938]. One judge accepted that the relevant date was the date of removal from the State of habitual residence, whilst the other who reached a view held that it was the date of arrival in Israel.
Communication of Intention Not to Return a Child
Different positions have been adopted as to whether a retention will commence from the moment a person decides not to return a child, or whether the retention only commences from when the other custody holder learns of the intention not to return or that intention is specifically communicated.
United Kingdom - England & Wales
In Re S. (Minors) (Abduction: Wrongful Retention) [1994] Fam 70, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 117], the English High Court was prepared to accept that an uncommunicated decision by the abductor was of itself capable of constituting an act of wrongful retention.
Re A.Z. (A Minor) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 1 FLR 682, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 50]: the moment the mother unilaterally decided not to return the child was not the point in time at which the retention became wrongful. This was no more than an uncommunicated intention to retain the child in the future from which the mother could still have resiled. The retention could have originated from the date of the aunt's ex parte application for residence and prohibited steps orders.
United States of America
Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F. Supp. 264 (N.D. Iowa 1993), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 143].
The wrongful retention did not begin to run until the mother clearly communicated her desire to regain custody and asserted her parental right to have the child live with her.
Zuker v. Andrews, 2 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D. Mass. 1998) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKf 122], the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that a retention occurs when, on an objective assessment, a dispossessed custodian learns that the child is not to be returned.
Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2006), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 879].
The Court of Appeals held that ultimately it was not required to decide whether a child was not retained under the Convention until a parent unequivocally communicated his or her desire to regain custody, but it assumed that this standard applied.
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