HC/E/CH 1086
SWITZERLAND
Bundesgericht
Superior Appellate Court
GERMANY
SWITZERLAND
21 February 2011
Final
Rights of Custody - Art. 3 | Acquiescence - Art. 13(1)(a) | Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b) | Issues Relating to Return | Procedural Matters
Appeal dismissed, return ordered
The Federal Tribunal considered that the child's custody was shared and that it was irrelevant that the mother had gone to Switzerland before the dismissal of her application for the right to determine the location of the child's residence. The Tribunal pointed out that it was obvious that the father's acquisition of the right to determine the location of the child's residence was also irrelevant as it was subsequent to the removal.
In any event, and although the father's parents had exercised great influence over him, the father was the applicant and the child's return would be a return to the father, who would continue to care for the child with his parents' assistance as he had done before the removal - restoration of the status quo ante being the purpose of the Convention.
The father actually exercised his right of custody at the time of the removal. The fact that the mother had kept the child away from the father, but in the same country before going to Switzerland, did not imply that custody was not actually exercised.
Ruling otherwise would void the Convention of its useful effect since it would be sufficient for the abducting parent to hide the child first in the same country before moving it abroad in order to evade the removal's wrongfulness. In the present case, the mother had removed the child from the family home on a fallacious pretext, and the father had applied for its return as soon as he had located the child's residence.
The mother claimed acquiescence by the father and pleaded in support an e-mail message allegedly sent to her by the father after the Superior Court's ruling. The father denied having written that message. In the present case, the Federal Tribunal found that several clues raised serious doubts as to the father's actual authorship of that message. It considered that it was not proven that such a message had been sent, or sent by the father.
On an accessory basis, it added that even if that message existed and had been written by the father, its contents were not such as to allow acquiescence to be deduced: that message, like the other materials by the parents' hand, showed that they were able to express themselves in writing only in rudimentary and halting fashion.
These few erratic lines could not allow a deduction of the clear intent to accept the child's removal, especially since, the previous evening, the father had stated precisely the opposite and had stood by that attitude throughout the return proceedings.
The mother asserted that she was always sidelined and that this would continue in the event of return. The Tribunal observed that this risk did not concern the child. On the other hand, the mother also stated that the German authorities would immediately withdraw the child's custody from her and that she would no longer see her.
Yet the provisional rulings in the autumn of 2010 did not imply that the child would be removed from the mother and that she would no longer see the child. Admittedly, the grandparents tended greatly to monopolise the child during the day but had assured that the mother could have contacts with the child, and there was no reason to believe that the German authorities would allow the mother to be excluded without intervening.
For the remainder, no grave risk of harm connected specifically with the child's return to his father's residence was invoked, and the Tribunal could not deduce any risk from the materials in the record. Most of the points raised by the mother concerned the issue of custody and were not within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
While it was not possible to make the return order contingent on transfer of the child's physical custody to the mother by the German authorities (which would be a ruling on the merits), the Swiss Central Authority should be required to identify, through the German Central Authority, the local authorities having jurisdiction over the child, and to inform them of the situation and especially the grandparents' tendency to monopolise the child so that the local authorities might support the mother in order for her to maintain relations with the child until a ruling on the merits.
There was in fact no inconsistency when the tribunal ordered the child's return and concurrently allowed the mother some time to return it voluntarily. That was common practice and consistent with the Federal Act on International Child Abduction and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children and Adults (LF-EEA) (Art. 12). The Tribunal also noted that the trial judge had duly detailed the terms of a mandatory return in accordance with the LF-EEA (Art. 10). The return was to be performed towards the father, who was the applicant whose custody rights had been breached, with whom the child had lived before the removal, and who could receive him again.
Federal Tribunal and remedies:
The Federal Tribunal pointed out that under the LF-EEA, the Superior Court acts in the first and final instance, and the principle of appeal on issues of fact does not apply. The civil appeal, having been brought within the statutory period of 10 days against a final decision, was admissible in principle.
The civil appeal could be entered on the basis of breach of federal and international law, in this case the 1980 Convention in particular. The Federal Tribunal applied the law sua sponte.
Federal Tribunal and requirement of reasoned judgment:
The mother considered that the Superior Court had breached its obligation to state the basis for its decision. Under Swiss law, a ruling must be phrased so that the party can understand its scope so as to be able to enter an appropriate challenge. The Tribunal stressed, nonetheless, that the court had considered all the factual statements or legal points raised, and the decision could be limited to a statement of the factors which had determined the outcome.
Author of the summary: Aude Fiorini, United Kingdom
Courts in a variety of Contracting States have afforded a wide interpretation to what amounts to the actual exercise of rights of custody, see:
Australia
Director General, Department of Community Services Central Authority v. J.C. and J.C. and T.C. (1996) FLC 92-717 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 68];
Austria
8Ob121/03g, Oberster Gerichtshof, 30/10/2003 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AT 548];
Belgium
N° de rôle: 02/7742/A, Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles 6/3/2003 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/BE 545];
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re W. (Abduction: Procedure) [1995] 1 FLR 878, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 37];
France
Ministère Public c. M.B. Cour d'Appel at Aix en Provence (6e Ch.) 23 March 1989, 79 Rev. crit. 1990, 529 note Y. Lequette [INCADAT cite: HC/E/FR 62];
CA Amiens 4 mars 1998, n° 5704759 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/FR 704];
CA Aix en Provence 8/10/2002, L. v. Ministère Public, Mme B et Mesdemoiselles L (N° de rôle 02/14917) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/FR 509];
Germany
11 UF 121/03, Oberlandesgericht Hamm, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 822];
21 UF 70/01, Oberlandesgericht Köln, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/DE 491];
New Zealand
The Chief Executive of the Department for Courts for R. v. P., 20 September 1999, Court of Appeal of New Zealand [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 304];
United Kingdom - Scotland
O. v. O. 2002 SC 430 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 507].
In the above case the Court of Session stated that it might be going too far to suggest, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had done in Friedrich v Friedrich that only clear and unequivocal acts of abandonment might constitute failure to exercise custody rights. However, Friedrich was fully approved of in a later Court of Session judgment, see:
S. v S., 2003 SLT 344 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 577].
This interpretation was confirmed by the Inner House of the Court of Session (appellate court) in:
AJ. V. FJ. 2005 CSIH 36, 2005 1 S.C. 428 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 803].
Switzerland
K. v. K., Tribunal cantonal de Horgen [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CZ 299];
449/III/97/bufr/mour, Cour d'appel du canton de Berne, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 433];
5A_479/2007/frs, Tribunal fédéral, IIè cour civile, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 953];
United States of America
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir) [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 82];
Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 394 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2004), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 779];
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 1029].
See generally Beaumont P.R. and McEleavy P.E., 'The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction' OUP, Oxford, 1999 at p. 84 et seq.
There has been general acceptance that where the exception of acquiescence is concerned regard must be paid in the first instance to the subjective intentions of the left behind parent, see:
Australia
Commissioner, Western Australia Police v. Dormann, JP (1997) FLC 92-766 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 213];
Barry Eldon Matthews (Commissioner, Western Australia Police Service) v. Ziba Sabaghian PT 1767 of 2001 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 345];
Austria
5Ob17/08y, Oberster Gerichtshof, (Austrian Supreme Court) 1/4/2008 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AT 981].
Considering the issue for the first time, Austria's supreme court held that acquiescence in a temporary state of affairs would not suffice for the purposes of Article 13(1) a), rather there had to be acquiescence in a durable change in habitual residence.
Belgium
N° de rôle: 02/7742/A, Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles 6/3/2003, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/BE 545];
Canada
Ibrahim v. Girgis, 2008 ONCA 23, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CA 851];
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re H. and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] AC 72 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 46];
In this case the House of Lords affirmed that acquiescence was not to be found in passing remarks or letters written by a parent who has recently suffered the trauma of the removal of his children.
Ireland
K. v. K., 6 May 1998, transcript, Supreme Court of Ireland [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 285];
Israel
Dagan v. Dagan 53 P.D (3) 254 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IL 807];
New Zealand
P. v. P., 13 March 2002, Family Court at Greymouth (New Zealand), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/NZ 533];
United Kingdom - Scotland
M.M. v. A.M.R. or M. 2003 SCLR 71, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKs 500];
South Africa
Smith v. Smith 2001 (3) SA 845 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/ZA 499];
Switzerland
5P.367/2005 /ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/CH 841].
In keeping with this approach there has also been a reluctance to find acquiescence where the applicant parent has sought initially to secure the voluntary return of the child or a reconciliation with the abducting parent, see:
United Kingdom - England & Wales
Re H. and Others (Minors) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] AC 72 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 46];
P. v. P. (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1998] 2 FLR 835, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 179];
Ireland
R.K. v. J.K. (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [2000] 2 IR 416, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/IE 285];
United States of America
Wanninger v. Wanninger, 850 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1994), [INCADAT cite: HC/E/USf 84];
In the Australian case Townsend & Director-General, Department of Families, Youth and Community (1999) 24 Fam LR 495, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/AU 290] negotiation over the course of 12 months was taken to amount to acquiescence but, notably, in the court's exercise of its discretion it decided to make a return order.
Preparation of INCADAT commentary in progress.