CASE

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Case Name

G. M. E. M. c. J. D. D. S. s/ reintegro de hijos

INCADAT reference

HC/E/PE 1321

Court

Country

PERU

Name

Sala Civil permanente de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Republica

Level

Superior Appellate Court

Judge(s)
Almenara Bryson, Estrella Cama, Rodríguez Chavez, Calderón Puertas, Humaní Llamas

States involved

Requesting State

SPAIN

Requested State

PERU

Decision

Date

22 October 2010

Status

Final

Grounds

Aims of the Convention - Preamble, Arts 1 and 2 | Habitual Residence - Art. 3 | Removal and Retention - Arts 3 and 12 | Rights of Custody - Art. 3 | Acquiescence - Art. 13(1)(a) | Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b) | Procedural Matters | Consent - Art. 13(1)(a)

Order

Appeal allowed, return ordered

HC article(s) Considered

1 3 4 12 13(1)(a) 13(1)(b)

HC article(s) Relied Upon

4 13(1)(b)

Other provisions

-

Authorities | Cases referred to

-

Published in

-

INCADAT comment

Aims & Scope of the Convention

Convention Aims
Convention Aims
Habitual Residence
Habitual Residence

SUMMARY

Summary available in EN | ES

Facts

The case concerned two children, born in March 2005 and August 2006, whose parents had gotten married in 2004. On 3 January 2011, the father left Spain, where the family had their habitual residence, and travelled to Peru with the children.

On 6 January, the mother travelled to Peru to get the children back to Spain. The father and the children were staying with the father's parents. The father did not allow the children to return to Spain with their mother, and the mother went back alone.

On January 19, the father initiated proceedings for sole custody in Peru. On January 26, the father travelled to Spain without the children. The mother later alleged that the father had told her that he would not let her see the children again and that he would leave Spain to evade the Spanish justice system. The mother reported these events on 27 January 2011.

On 31 January, the first instance court (Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Insturcciones de Torrejón de Ardoz, Madrid, Spain) decided that the parents had joint custody rights and ordered a prohibition to leave Spain against the father. During these proceedings, the parents agreed that the children would go back to Spain with their mother; the father signed an authorisation in that regard.

On 9 February, the mother travelled to Spain to pick up the children but the grandparents prevented the return. The mother filed a complaint with the police and a habeas corpus petition against the grandparents. In those proceedings the grandparents were considered the children's de facto custodians.

On 24 May, the Peruvian Central Authority (Ministerio de la Mujer y Poblaciones Vulnerables) initiated judicial proceedings for the return of the children to Spain under the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention.

In the Hague return proceedings, the father alleged that he had left Spain with the mother's consent. He argued that the mother had orally authorised the removal because she wanted to start a new life with her new partner. The father also alleged that the decision to travel to Peru was based on the mother's inappropriate behaviour since she used to go to her new partner's house with the children.

In July 2012, the return request was rejected for the following reasons:
a) There was no wrongful removal or retention due to the mother's consent. Additionally, the court considered that the Spanish decisions had been issued after the children entered Peru;
b) As the children were born within wedlock, both parents held custody rights; it was considered that the existence of a judicial decision granting the mother sole custody rights before the removal was not proved;
c) The children were settled in their new environment in Peru, they enjoyed a good standard of living and a return would have implied a grave risk of harm to them (Art. 13(1)(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention).

The mother appealed the decision. She stated that the facts of the case which pointed to a wrongful removal had not been taken into account, that is, the settlement before the Spanish Court in which both parents had agreed that the children would return to Spain.

In November 2012, the Civil Division of the Superior Court (Segunda Sala Civil de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Lima Norte) affirmed the first instance decision due to the mother's consent or acquiescence to the removal. The Court also held that there was no wrongful retention since the grandparents had been considered the children's de facto custodians in the habeas corpus proceedings. The mother appealed.

Ruling

Appeal allowed, return ordered.

Grounds

Aims of the Convention - Preamble, Arts 1 and 2


The Supreme Court held that the objective of Hague return proceedings is to provide a fast solution to prevent the taking parent "who broke the family union" from benefitting. Thus, the decision on the return of the child should not be confused with a decision on custody rights, and cannot result in unnecessary delays since the most important matter is determining whether the child should be returned to his / her habitual residence. This does not amount to leaving the child unattended, but rather to have the issue of custody be resolved in the country of origin.

The Court noted that courts generally use the concept "best interests of the child" to disobey the mandate of the Convention. They use general expressions or add additional content to this principle by including subjective expressions in accordance with their social and cultural values, without any objective reference. The Court emphasised, however, that in Hague Convention cases the "best interests of the child" have to be considered in line with the objectives of the Convention, i.e. this principle is respected where a protection mechanism is applied expeditiously.

Habitual Residence - Art. 3


The Court held that the habitual residence of the children was in Spain, the place where they had lived before the wrongful removal. Therefore, any changes in domicile after removal were irrelevant because they were consequences of the wrongful action. In addition, the new domicile could not be taken into account since that would imply endorsing the removal. The Court also stated that the mother's plans to move to another place in Spain could not be used to affect the determination of habitual residence of the children prior to the removal.

The Court considered that habitual residence, in accordance with the concept of habitual residence under the Convention, was the one the children had prior to the removal. The new house that would possibly be arranged by the mother during the return proceedings could not be considered in this regard.

Removal & Retention - Arts 3 and 12
The Court held that the wrongful removal had occurred on 3 January 2011 when the father travelled with the children to Peru. The Court also considered that, in light of the settlement the parents entered into, before the Spanish court of first instance, the removal had been wrongful.

Removal and Retention - Arts 3 and 12

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Rights of Custody - Art. 3


The Court stated that the habeas corpus proceedings could not be determinative of the decision on whether the removal had been wrongful. Additionally, custody rights and visitation rights had to be resolved in the State of origin.

Acquiescence - Art. 13(1)(a)


The Court held that the father's allegation that the mother had acquiesced to the removal of the children to Peru had not been proved.

Grave Risk - Art. 13(1)(b)


The Court held that the exceptions to return are to be applied restrictively. The Court held that there were no reasons to believe that the return would expose the children to an intolerable situation or to a grave risk of psychological harm in accordance with Article 13(1)(b).

Although the psychological reports stated that the mother was not in the children's "family scheme", they did confirm that they talked about her. The children mentioned that she cared for them and had nice memories of her.

The Court considered that, even though they had stayed in Peru for a certain time and they had new bonds there, they would resettle and overcome the consequences of a return to Spain quickly because they were still very young. For these reasons, the Court held that there was no evidence that the children's psychological integrity would be exposed to a risk of harm because of the return.

Procedural Matters


The Court considered that habeas corpus proceedings and return proceedings have different objectives. The latter kind seek to guarantee the return of the wrongfully removed child to his / her habitual residence; and the former kind, the protection of constitutional rights. Thus, in habeas corpus proceedings, the existence of a violation of a fundamental right could be determined, but not the merits of a child custody dispute.

Author of the summary: Professor Nieve Rubaja and Antonela Rojas, Argentina

Consent - Art. 13(1)(a)

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INCADAT comment

Convention Aims

Courts in all Contracting States must inevitably make reference to and evaluate the aims of the Convention if they are to understand the purpose of the instrument, and so be guided in how its concepts should be interpreted and provisions applied.

The 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, explicitly and implicitly, embodies a range of aims and objectives, positive and negative, as it seeks to achieve a delicate balance between the competing interests of the central actors; the child, the left behind parent and the abducting parent, see for example the discussion in the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court: W.(V.) v. S.(D.), (1996) 2 SCR 108, (1996) 134 DLR 4th 481 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 17].

Article 1 identifies the core aims, namely that the Convention seeks:
"a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and
 b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States."

Further clarification, most notably to the primary purpose of achieving the return of children where their removal or retention has led to the breach of actually exercised rights of custody, is given in the Preamble.

Therein it is recorded that:

"the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody;

and that States signatory desire:

 to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention;

 to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence; and

 to secure protection for rights of access."

The aim of return and the manner in which it should best be achieved is equally reinforced in subsequent Articles, notably in the duties required of Central Authorities (Arts 8-10) and in the requirement for judicial authorities to act expeditiously (Art. 11).

Article 13, along with Articles 12(2) and 20, which contain the exceptions to the summary return mechanism, indicate that the Convention embodies an additional aim, namely that in certain defined circumstances regard may be paid to the specific situation, including the best interests, of the individual child or even taking parent.

The Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report draws (at para. 19) attention to an implicit aim on which the Convention rests, namely that any debate on the merits of custody rights should take place before the competent authorities in the State where the child had his habitual residence prior to its removal, see for example:

Argentina
W., E. M. c. O., M. G., Supreme Court, June 14, 1995 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/AR 362]
 
Finland
Supreme Court of Finland: KKO:2004:76 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/FI 839]

France
CA Bordeaux, 19 janvier 2007, No de RG 06/002739 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/FR 947]

Israel
T. v. M., 15 April 1992, transcript (Unofficial Translation), Supreme Court of Israel [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/IL 214]

Netherlands
X. (the mother) v. De directie Preventie, en namens Y. (the father) (14 April 2000, ELRO nr. AA 5524, Zaaksnr.R99/076HR) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/NL 316]

Switzerland
5A.582/2007 Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung, 4 décembre 2007 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CH 986]

United Kingdom - Scotland
N.J.C. v. N.P.C. [2008] CSIH 34, 2008 S.C. 571 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKs 996]

United States of America
Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 1998) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 125]
 
The Pérez-Vera Report equally articulates the preventive dimension to the instrument's return aim (at paras. 17, 18, 25), a goal which was specifically highlighted during the ratification process of the Convention in the United States (see: Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10505 (1986)) and which has subsequently been relied upon in that Contracting State when applying the Convention, see:

Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2008) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 741]

Applying the principle of equitable tolling where an abducted child had been concealed was held to be consistent with the purpose of the Convention to deter child abduction.

Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 578]

In contrast to other federal Courts of Appeals, the 11th Circuit was prepared to interpret a ne exeat right as including the right to determine a child's place of residence since the goal of the Hague Convention was to deter international abduction and the ne exeat right provided a parent with decision-making authority regarding the child's international relocation.

In other jurisdictions, deterrence has on occasion been raised as a relevant factor in the interpretation and application of the Convention, see for example:

Canada
J.E.A. v. C.L.M. (2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (N.S.C.A.) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 754]

United Kingdom - England and Wales
Re A.Z. (A Minor) (Abduction: Acquiescence) [1993] 1 FLR 682 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 50]

Aims and objectives may equally rise to prominence during the life of the instrument, such as the promotion of transfrontier contact, which it has been submitted will arise by virtue of a strict application of the Convention's summary return mechanism, see:

New Zealand
S. v. S. [1999] NZFLR 625 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/NZ 296]

United Kingdom - England and Wales
Re R. (Child Abduction: Acquiescence) [1995] 1 FLR 716 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 60]

There is no hierarchy between the different aims of the Convention (Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report, at para. 18).  Judicial interpretation may therefore differ as between Contracting States as more or less emphasis is placed on particular objectives.  Equally jurisprudence may evolve, whether internally or internationally.

In United Kingdom case law (England and Wales) a decision of that jurisdiction's then supreme jurisdiction, the House of Lords, led to a reappraisal of the Convention's aims and consequently a re-alignment in court practice as regards the exceptions:

Re M. (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 937]

Previously a desire to give effect to the primary goal of promoting return and thereby preventing an over-exploitation of the exceptions, had led to an additional test of exceptionality being added to the exceptions, see for example:

Re M. (A Child) (Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2007] EWCA Civ 260 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 901]

It was this test of exceptionality which was subsequently held to be unwarranted by the House of Lords in Re M. (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 AC 1288 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 937]

- Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine:

In United States Convention case law different approaches have been taken in respect of applicants who have or are alleged to have themselves breached court orders under the "fugitive disentitlement doctrine".

In Re Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 1995) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 150], the fugitive disentitlement doctrine was applied, the applicant father in the Convention application having left the United States to escape his criminal conviction and other responsibilities to the United States courts.

Walsh v. Walsh, No. 99-1747 (1st Cir. July 25, 2000) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 326]

In the instant case the father was a fugitive. Secondly, it was arguable there was some connection between his fugitive status and the petition. But the court found that the connection not to be strong enough to support the application of the doctrine. In any event, the court also held that applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine would impose too severe a sanction in a case involving parental rights.

In March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 386], the doctrine was not applied where the applicant was in breach of civil orders.

In the Canadian case Kovacs v. Kovacs (2002), 59 O.R. (3d) 671 (Sup. Ct.) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 760], the father's fugitive status was held to be a factor in there being a grave risk of harm facing the child.

Author: Peter McEleavy

Habitual Residence

The interpretation of the central concept of habitual residence (Preamble, Art. 3, Art. 4) has proved increasingly problematic in recent years with divergent interpretations emerging in different jurisdictions. There is a lack of uniformity as to whether in determining habitual residence the emphasis should be exclusively on the child, with regard paid to the intentions of the child's care givers, or primarily on the intentions of the care givers. At least partly as a result, habitual residence may appear a very flexible connecting factor in some Contracting States yet much more rigid and reflective of long term residence in others.

Any assessment of the interpretation of habitual residence is further complicated by the fact that cases focusing on the concept may concern very different factual situations. For example habitual residence may arise for consideration following a permanent relocation, or a more tentative move, albeit one which is open-ended or potentially open-ended, or indeed the move may be for a clearly defined period of time.

General Trends:

United States Federal Appellate case law may be taken as an example of the full range of interpretations which exist with regard to habitual residence.

Child Centred Focus

The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit has advocated strongly for a child centred approach in the determination of habitual residence:

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 125 ALR Fed. 703 (6th Cir. 1993) (6th Cir. 1993) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 142]

Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/US 935].

See also:

Villalta v. Massie, No. 4:99cv312-RH (N.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 1999) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 221].

Combined Child's Connection / Parental Intention Focus

The United States Courts of Appeals for the 3rd and 8th Circuits, have espoused a child centred approach but with reference equally paid to the parents' present shared intentions.

The key judgment is that of Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 83].

See also:

Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 530];

Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2006) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 879].

In the latter case a distinction was drawn between the situation of very young children, where particular weight was placed on parental intention(see for example: Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 808]) and that of older children where the impact of parental intention was more limited.

Parental Intention Focus

The judgment of the Federal Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 301] has been highly influential in providing that there should ordinarily be a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence before a child can acquire a new one.

This interpretation has been endorsed and built upon in other Federal appellate decisions so that where there was not a shared intention on the part of the parents as to the purpose of the move this led to an existing habitual residence being retained, even though the child had been away from that jurisdiction for an extended period of time. See for example:

Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 777]: United States habitual residence retained after 8 months of an intended 4 year stay in Germany;

Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 780]: United States habitual residence retained during 32 month stay in Mexico;

Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp.2d 1045 (E.D. Wash. 2001) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 482]: United States habitual residence retained during 27 month stay in Greece.

The Mozes approach has also been approved of by the Federal Court of Appeals for the 2nd and 7th Circuits:

Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2005) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 776];

Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (2006 7th Cir.) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/USf 878].

It should be noted that within the Mozes approach the 9th Circuit did acknowledge that given enough time and positive experience, a child's life could become so firmly embedded in the new country as to make it habitually resident there notwithstanding lingering parental intentions to the contrary.

Other Jurisdictions

There are variations of approach in other jurisdictions:

Austria
The Supreme Court of Austria has ruled that a period of residence of more than six months in a State will ordinarily be characterized as habitual residence, and even if it takes place against the will of the custodian of the child (since it concerns a factual determination of the centre of life).

8Ob121/03g, Oberster Gerichtshof [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/AT 548].

Canada
In the Province of Quebec, a child centred focus is adopted:

In Droit de la famille 3713, No 500-09-010031-003 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CA 651], the Cour d'appel de Montréal held that the determination of the habitual residence of a child was a purely factual issue to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case with regard to the reality of the child's life, rather than that of his parents. The actual period of residence must have endured for a continuous and not insignificant period of time; the child must have a real and active link to the place, but there is no minimum period of residence which is specified.

Germany
A child centred, factual approach is also evident in German case law:

2 UF 115/02, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 944].

This has led to the Federal Constitutional Court accepting that a habitual residence may be acquired notwithstanding the child having been wrongfully removed to the new State of residence:

Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1206/98, 29. Oktober 1998  [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/DE 233].

The Constitutional Court upheld the finding of the Higher Regional Court that the children had acquired a habitual residence in France, notwithstanding the nature of their removal there. This was because habitual residence was a factual concept and during their nine months there, the children had become integrated into the local environment.

Israel
Alternative approaches have been adopted when determining the habitual residence of children. On occasion, strong emphasis has been placed on parental intentions. See:

Family Appeal 1026/05 Ploni v. Almonit [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 865];

Family Application 042721/06 G.K. v Y.K. [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 939].

However, reference has been made to a more child centred approach in other cases. See:

decision of the Supreme Court in C.A. 7206/03, Gabai v. Gabai, P.D. 51(2)241;

FamA 130/08 H v H [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/Il 922].

New Zealand
In contrast to the Mozes approach the requirement of a settled intention to abandon an existing habitual residence was specifically rejected by a majority of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. See

S.K. v. K.P. [2005] 3 NZLR 590 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/NZ 816].

Switzerland
A child centred, factual approach is evident in Swiss case law:

5P.367/2005/ast, Bundesgericht, II. Zivilabteilung (Tribunal Fédéral, 2ème Chambre Civile) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/CH 841].

United Kingdom
The standard approach is to consider the settled intention of the child's carers in conjunction with the factual reality of the child's life.

Re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562, [1990] 2 All ER 961, [1990] 2 FLR 450, sub nom C. v. S. (A Minor) (Abduction) [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/UKe 2]. For academic commentary on the different models of interpretation given to habitual residence. See:

R. Schuz, "Habitual Residence of Children under the Hague Child Abduction Convention: Theory and Practice", Child and Family Law Quarterly Vol 13, No. 1, 2001, p. 1;

R. Schuz, "Policy Considerations in Determining Habitual Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context", Journal of Transnational Law and Policy Vol. 11, 2001, p. 101.