Buscador de jurisprudencia

Objections of the Child to a Return - Art. 13(2)

The Court recalled that it had already held that within the legal framework set up by the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and Brussels IIa Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003), "if the children's opinions [were] be taken into account, their opposition was not necessarily an obstacle to their return" (see Raw v. France, No. 10131/11, § 94, 7 March 2013 [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/ 1271]).
 
When assessing an application for a child's return, Council of Europe Member State courts must not only consider arguable objections to the child's return, but must also make a ruling giving specific reasons in the light of the circumstances of the case. Both a refusal to take account of objections to the return capable of falling within the scope of Arts 12, 13 and 20 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and insufficient reasoning in the ruling dismissing or accepting such objections would be contrary to the requirements of Art. 8 of the ECHR and also to the aim and purpose of the Hague Convention. Recalling the Grand Chamber ruling in X v. Latvia [INCADAT Reference: HC/E/ 1234], the Court held that "[d]ue consideration of such allegations, demonstrated by reasoning of the domestic courts that [was] not automatic and stereotyped, but sufficiently detailed in the light of the exceptions set out in the Hague Convention, which must be interpreted strictly, [was] necessary".

While, the Court underlined its concern with the fact that only one of the children had been over ten years old when heard, and had met the minimum lawful age requirement for her opinion to be heard by the Romanian courts, it was prepared to accept that the conditions for the domestic courts to be able to rely on Art. 13(2) of the Hague Convention had been met.
The Court noted that the objections of the children were decisive in the decision of the domestic courts to refuse their return to the State of their habitual residence. After referring to the text of the Hague Convention and the Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report, the Court considered that "while the [Hague] Convention recognize[d] that the objecting child should have a voice, it [did] not consider that voice to amount to a veto in the process of deciding whether he or she [would] be returned".

The Court noted that the Romanian courts had also examined other aspects of the children's circumstances. However, it was not entirely convinced that the Romanian courts "had sufficiently balanced the [father]'s interest of a right to family life against the competing interest of the other parties in the case and therefore had sufficiently protected the best interest of the children as defined in the light of the Hague Convention principles".

In particular, the last instance court gave no express consideration to the issue of whether the children could quickly re-adapt to a return in the United States of America. Moreover, it did not appear that the Romanian courts had attempted to examine if it would have been possible for the children to return to the United States of America accompanied by their mother and whether arrangements could have been made within the legal framework of the State of habitual residence or following agreements with the father for them to live together, separately from their father pending the outcome of divorce and custody proceedings, and consequently whether such arrangements would have alleviated the serious risks mentioned by the Romanian court of last instance. The Court noted that such considerations were even more relevant as neither the psychological evaluation report nor the social investigation report had directly addressed the question of the children's return or stated that it would be in any way harmful if they were to return to the United States of America accompanied by their mother and lived separately from their father.

The Court recalled that the interests of the child were paramount in abduction cases. Thus it may well have been justified, more than thirteen months after the removal for the Romanian courts to hold that the family situation they had been familiar with at the time of the departure had changed, and that it was in their best interests to remain in Romania with their mother. However, for the Court to accept that a change in the relevant facts may exceptionally justify such a decision, it had to be satisfied "that the change was not brought about by the State's actions or inactions". In the present case the 13 months it took for the Romanian courts to adopt the final decision failed to meet the urgency of the situation, consequently the Court considered that the change in the children's circumstances was also considerably influenced by the slow reaction of the authorities.

For these reasons, the Court considered that the father had suffered a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for his family life, in that the decision-making process under domestic law did not satisfy the procedural requirements inherent in Art. 8 of the ECHR. Therefore, there had been a violation of Art. 8 of the ECHR.

Dissenting Opinion:
Judge López Guerra, with whom judge Motoc joined, dissented from the Chamber's opinion concerning a violation of Art. 8. The dissent held that the Chamber's reasoning and final decision on the issue dealt with matters "which should be left to the consideration of the domestic courts, which were in a much better position to assess directly the individual characteristics of this case". From a substantive point of view, the ECrtHR Chamber was not in a position to criticize the Romanian courts' interpretation and application of Art. 13(2) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention in this case. The reasoning of both the County Court and the Court of Appeal was extended and detailed and explicitly assessed the credibility and reliability of the children's testimony, given their youth. The ECrtHR Chamber, without having any direct means to assess the circumstances and testimonies of the children and parties, could not substitute its own opinion for the decisions of the courts which had examined the case, furthermore declaring that it was "not entirely convinced that the domestic courts had sufficiently balanced the applicant's interests of a right to family life against the competing interests of the other parties [to] the case". The dissent held that on the contrary, the facts of the case showed that the Romanian courts had indeed carefully assessed the balance of interests at stake. Their determination of what constituted the best interest of the children could not be deemed to be "unsatisfactory". Furthermore, the dissent did not accept the second reason given in the Chamber's judgment to support its finding of a violation of Art. 8, namely the duration of the proceedings. The dissent held that the time taken did not violate Art. 8 of the ECHR; the Romanian Courts had acted with the required rigour and expedience, and had thus fulfilled their Art. 8 obligations.

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

Art. 8 of the ECHR:
The father complained that the Romanian courts:

• had misinterpreted the provisions of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and had relied exclusively on the opinion of his children to deny him their return to the United States of America;
• had failed to provide sufficient reasons for ignoring the injunctions delivered by the U.S. courts and the documents submitted by the U.S. authorities;
• had failed to expedite the proceedings, which had prevented him from exercising his parental rights as the children had remained under their mother's control;
• and by unlawfully transferring the de facto jurisdiction on custody matters, the Romanian courts had discriminated against him and placed him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his wife.
  

Procedural Matters

The father was awarded 9,750 Euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 8,000 Euros in respect of costs and expenses.

Author of the summary: Peter McEleavy

Opposition de l'enfant au retour - art. 13(2)

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Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (CEDH)

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Questions procédurales

La Cour ordonna à la Roumanie de verser au père 9 750 euros pour dommage moral et 8 000 euros pour frais et dépens.

Auteur du résumé : Peter McEleavy

Objeciones del niño a la restitución - art. 13(2)

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Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos (CEDH)

Artículo 8 del CEDH:
El padre sostuvo que los tribunales rumanos:

• habían malinterpretado las disposiciones del Convenio de La Haya de 1980 sobre sustracción de menores y solo se habían basado en la opinión de los niños para denegar su restitución a los Estados Unidos;
• no habían expresado razones suficientes que justificaran el haber ignorado las órdenes judiciales emitidas por los tribunales estadounidenses, así como los documentos transmitidos por las autoridades de ese país;
• no habían actuado con celeridad, lo cual lo había privado de ejercer sus derechos parentales, ya que los niños habían quedado al cuidado de la madre;
• y que al prorrogar ilícitamente la competencia sobre la cuestión de hecho de la custodia de los hijos, los tribunales rumanos lo habían discriminado y colocado en una situación de clara desventaja frente a su esposa.

(Véase también más arriba "Artículo 13(2)" con respecto a la relación entre esta disposición y el artículo 8 del CEDH).

El Tribunal declaró que el rechazo de la demanda de restitución del padre constituía una injerencia en su derecho al respeto a la vida familiar. No obstante, como la injerencia estaba prevista por la ley, había que determinar si "en una sociedad democrática [era] necesaria" en el sentido del artículo 8(2) del CEDH. Con respecto a lograr un equilibrio entre los distintos derechos en juego, había que determinar si las autoridades rumanas habían actuado con rapidez y si habían dado la debida consideración al interés superior de los niños dentro del margen de apreciación que el Estado tiene para esas cuestiones.

El Tribunal señaló que, dado que el Preámbulo del Convenio de La Haya de 1980 sobre sustracción de menores dispone la restitución del niño "al Estado de su residencia habitual", se debe generar la convicción de los tribunales de los Estados miembros del Consejo de Europa de que ese país cuenta con salvaguardias adecuadas y, en caso de que se conociere una situación de riesgo, de que dispone de medidas de protección concretas.

Además señaló, respecto de la reunificación de los hijos con sus padres, que también se debía evaluar el plazo y la implementación de la medida. Estos casos deben ser tramitados con urgencia ya que el transcurso del tiempo puede tener consecuencias irreversibles en la relación de los niños con el padre ausente.

El Tribunal indicó que habían transcurrido trece meses entre la fecha en que el padre había formulado demanda de restitución y la fecha en que se había dictado sentencia definitiva. Consideró que las autoridades nacionales no habían actuado con celeridad, lo cual constituye un incumplimiento manifiesto de la ley aplicable.

El Juez López Guerra, a quien se unió el Juez Motoc, expresó su disidencia respecto de la opinión de la Sala sobre la configuración de una violación al artículo 8. Véase más arriba "Oposición a la restitución del niño - artículo 13(2)".

Artículo 6 del CEDH:
El Tribunal observó que el procedimiento de divorcio y custodia de los hijos iniciado por la madre en Rumanía se había extendido desde el 14 de octubre de 2008 hasta el 12 de marzo de 2014, es decir que había demorado cinco años y cinco meses en recorrer tres instancias. De forma unánime, el Tribunal consideró que había habido repetidos retrasos procesales a lo largo de todo el procedimiento. Declaró que la extensión total del procedimiento no había respetado el requisito del "plazo razonable". En consecuencia, se estaba frente a una vulneración del artículo 6 § 1 del CEDH.

Cuestiones procesales

Se concedió al padre la suma de 9 750 euros en concepto de daño moral y 8 000 euros por gastos y costas.

Autor del resumen: Peter McEleavy