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Case Name
B. v. Secretary for Justice [2008] NZFLR 723
INCADAT reference
HC/E/NZ 965
Court
NEW ZEALAND
High Court (Christchurch)
First Instance
Panckhurst J.
States involved
SPAIN
NEW ZEALAND
Decision
26 February 2008
Upheld on appeal
Procedural Matters
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Re G. (Abduction: Striking Out Application) [1995] 2 FLR 420; Re M. (Abduction: Undertakings) [1995] 1 FLR 1021; Re H.B. (Abduction: Children's Objections) [1998] 1 FLR 423; Re F. (Hague Convention: Child's Objections)(2006) Fam CA 685; Re D. (a Child) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] 1 All ER 783; Re M. and Another (Children) (Abduction: Rights of Custody) [2007] 3 WLR 957.
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INCADAT comment
Implementation & Application Issues
Delays by the Applicant Parent After Initiating Return Proceedings
SUMMARY
Summary available in
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Facts
In June 2003 mother and child moved to Tenerife. In August 2004 mother and child went to New Zealand for an extended holiday. But in late September the mother advised the father that their relationship was over and that she and the child would not be returning.
On 18 April 2005 the father initiated return proceedings in New Zealand. In November the Family Court declined to make a return order. That decision was overturned in April 2006, but when remitted to the Family Court a non-return order was again issued. In March 2007 a second appeal was successful.
On 30 May 2007 the Court of Appeal refused the mother leave to appeal (B. v. Secretary for Justice [2007] 3 NZLR 447 (CA)). The father did not take steps to implement the return order and as a consequence on 25 January 2008 the mother applied to have the return order set aside or discharged.
Ruling
Grounds
Procedural Matters
The judge noted that where a litigant sought to revisit a finding on the basis of new evidence this had to be done by way of appeal. In the present case this was not the mother’s object, she wished to challenge the implementation of the order on the ground that an 8 month delay was not in keeping with the principle of summary return. The judge further noted that in the light of the terms of the return order, which did not specify a date by which return was to be effected and was not subject to a further order provision, he did not have jurisdiction, express or implied, under New Zealand law to set aside the order made. It was noted that a statutory power to this effect existed in Australia: Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986, Reg 19A. Turning to the facts the judge held that whilst the mother had done enough to be seen as compliant, she had not made matters easy for the father. But in such circumstances it was for the father to invoke the assistance of the Court by obtaining directions to enforce a prompt return. The mother’s attitude did not excuse delay. Having made these findings the judge affirmed that had he had the jurisdiction he would have set aside the return order; a delay of 8 months was extreme and in the light of the other delays in the case it meant that it would no longer be in the best interests of the child to go back.
INCADAT comment
The ruling of the High Court was upheld by the Court of Appeal: Butler v. Craig [2008] NZCA 198.
Delays by the Applicant Parent After Initiating Return Proceedings
Whilst rare there have been examples of left behind parents initiating proceedings only then to not to continue, or of left behind parents succeeding in obtaining a return order only then not to take steps to secure enforcement. The response to situations is governed by the procedural rules of the Member State concerned.
Failure to Continue With Application
United Kingdom - England & Wales
A left behind parent who filed a return petition but then waited 10 months before taking any further steps had the application struck out as an abuse of process.
Re G. (Abduction: Striking Out Application) [1995] 2 FLR 410, [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 170].
Failure to Seek Enforcement of a Return Order
Australia
The Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986, Reg 19A provides:
(1) If a court makes a return order, the responsible Central Authority, the Article 3 applicant or a respondent to the proceeding may apply to the court, in accordance with Form 2D, for the discharge of the order.
(2) The court may make an order discharging a return order, or a part of a return order, only if it is satisfied that:
(a) all the parties consent to the return order being discharged; or
(b) since the return order was made, circumstances have arisen that make it impracticable for the order to be carried out; or
(c) exceptional circumstances exist that justify the return order being discharged; or
(d) the day on which the application for the discharge of the return order was made is more than 1 year after the return order was made or any appeal in relation to the return order was determined.
New Zealand
In B. v. Secretary for Justice, 26 February 2008 [INCADAT cite: HC/E/UKe 965] the High Court (Christchurch) held that there was no jurisdiction under New Zealand law to strike out a return order where the left behind parent had failed to act to secure its enforcement. The judge held that had such jurisdiction existed he would have struck out the return order, as an 8 month delay was extreme.
The ruling of the High Court was upheld by the Court of Appeal: Butler v. Craig [2008] NZCA 198.
Faits
En juin 2003, la mère et l'enfant s'installèrent à Tenerife. En août 2004, la mère et l'enfant allèrent passer de longues vacances en Nouvelle-Zélande. En septembre, la mère annonça au père que leur histoire était finie et qu'elle ne reviendrait pas avec l'enfant.
Le 18 avril, le père entama une procédure de retour en Nouvelle-Zélande. En novembre, le juge aux affaires familiales refusa d'ordonner le retour. Cette décision fut annulée et renvoyé au juge du premier degré qui de nouveau refusa d'ordonner le retour. En mars 2007, la cour d'appel accueillit le second recours du père.
Le 30 mai 2007, la cour d'appel refusa d'autoriser la mère à former un recours contre cette décision (B. v. Secretary forJustice [2007] 3 NZLR 447 (CA)). Le père ne prit aucune mesure en vue de faire exécuter l'ordonnance de retour. Le 25 janvier 2008, la mère demanda dès lors à voir déclarer l'ordonnance de retour caduque.
Dispositif
Motifs
Questions procédurales
Le juge remarqua que lorsqu'un litigant cherche à revisiter une décision sur la base de nouvelles preuves, la voie de l'appel est ouverte. En l'espèce la mère voulait remettre en cause une ordonnance de retour au motif que 8 mois sans exécution étaient contraires au principe de retour immédiat. Le juge nota que les termes de l'ordonannce ne spécifiaient pas de date à laquelle le retour devait avoir lieu et qu'aucune décision n'était pendante sur ce point. Il ajouta que le droit néo-zélandais ne lui donnait pas compétence implicitement ou expressément pour déclarer caduque une ordonnance de retour. Il fut observé qu'une compétence similaire existait en droit australien dans la loi mettant en oeuvre la Convention :Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986, Reg 19A. En l'espèce, le juge estima que si la mère avait fait ce qu'il fallait pour paraître de bonne foi, elle n'avait pas rendu les choses faciles pour le père. Toutefois, dans de telles circonstances il appartenait au père de demander l'assistance de la Cour afin d'obtenir une exécution rapide de l'ordonnance de retour. L'attitude de la mère n'excusait pas le retard. Ceci étant, le juge affirma que s'il en avait eu le pouvoir, il aurait déclaré l'ordonnance caduque: le retard de 8 mois était énorme et vu les autres retards pris dans l'affaire, on pouvait considérer qu'il n'était plus dans l'intérêt de l'enfant de rentrer à Tenerife.
Commentaire INCADAT
La decision de la High Court a été confirmée par la Cour d'appel: Butler v. Craig [2008] NZCA 198.
Retards du parent demandeur après l'introduction de la procédure
Traduction en cours - veuillez vous référer à la version anglaise.